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RESUMEN 
El artículo presenta dos líneas de investigación. La primera, de naturaleza histórica, 
considera la relación de la filosofía de Suárez con el agustinismo filosófico, en particular 
con Enrique de Gante y Duns Escoto. Esta sección concluye afirmando que este influjo 
es la principal causa de las diferencias entre Suárez y Tomás de Aquino. En efecto, en 
la medida que Suárez acepta determinados conceptos del agustinismo filosófico, que fue 
el principal inspirador de la condena parisina del Aquinate en 1277, se pone en de-
sacuerdo con Tomás de Aquino. La segunda línea de investigación estudia algunos 
aspectos del sistema filosófico desarrollado en las Disputationes metaphysicae, conclu-
yendo que: 1) su concepto de sustancia material se asemeja a lo que Descartes llamará 
posteriormente res extensa; 2) su concepto de accidente abre el camino de un cierto 
fenomenismo moderno; 3) su teoría actualista del ser, al negar la existencia de la po-
tencia y, por lo tanto, la distinción real entre la esencia y el esse, posibilita la reducción 
racionalista del ser a esencia, así como la reducción de la esencia al estado de un 
concepto objetivo o, para decirlo en otros términos, a la objetividad  racional. 
Palabras clave: agustinismo filosófico, Enrique de Gante, Duns Escoto; Descartes, 
Kant; material y forma, sustancia y accidentes, esencia y esse (acto de ser), acto y po-
tencia. 
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The article pursues two lines of investigation. The first line of investigation is 
historical in nature and considers the relation between the philosophy of Suárez and 
Philosophical Augustinianism: in particular his relation with Henry of Ghent and Duns 
Scotus. This section concludes that this influence is the main explanation for the differ-
rences between Suárez and Thomas Aquinas. In fact, insofar as Suárez accepts certain 
influences from Philosophical Augustinianism, which was the main inspiration of the 
1277 condemnation of Aquinas in Paris, he puts himself at odds with Thomas. The 
second line of investigation considers some aspects of the philosophical system he 
works out in the Disputationes metaphysicae, concluding that: 1) his concept of physical 
substance is virtually akin to what Descartes will call res extensa; 2) his concept of 
accident paves the way for a certain strand of modern phenomenism; 3) his actualist 
theory of being, by denying the existence of potency, and therewith the real distinction 
between essence and esse, paves the way for the rationalist reduction of being to essence 
alone, and of essence to the status of an objective concept or, to put it another way, to 
rational objectivity. 
Keywords: philosophical Augustinianism, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus; 
Descartes, Kant; matter and form, substance and accident, essence and esse (act of 
being), act and potency. 
 
Since it is impossible to comprehensively compare two philosophical 
systems in the limited space of an article, our goal in this paper is restricted          
to two points: to indicate the discontinuity between Thomas Aquinas and 
Francisco Suárez on certain key issues and to show how Suárez’s thought 
prepared the way for certain fundamental characteristics of modern philosophy. 
A useful preliminary and synthetic vision of the philosophies of the two 
authors is available in the article, Tesi di Tommaso d’Aquino e di Francisco 
Suárez1, which lists and compares the 24 Thomist theses published by the Sacred 
Congregation for Studies on 27 July 19142, and the 24 theses attributed to Suárez 
                                                     
1     Appendix of Jesús Villagrasa, ed., Neotomismo e suarezismo: Il confronto di Cornelio Fabro 
(Rome: APRA, 2006), 165-178. The theses are listed in both Latin and Italian.  
2     Cf. AA.VV., Acta Apostolicae Sedis 6 (1914) 383-386. 
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by L.G. Alonso Getino3. References on Aquinas are available in the well-known 
study of E. Hugon4, while those for Suárez in the article of Getino.    
It is easiest to understand our objectives of research within a historical 
framework, and we thus begin with a brief comment on certain historical 
questions. 
 
I. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ: A MIDPOINT BETWEEN THOMIST ARISTOTE-
LIANISM AND CERTAIN AUGUSTINIAN-FRANCISCAN PHILOSOPHI-
CAL CURRENTS 
J. Iturrioz has already highlighted the fact Suárez was deeply influenced by 
the work of his predecessors5. The monumental Disputationes metaphysicae, for 
example, is markedly eclectic in nature and includes no less than 7.718 citations 
from 247 authors. While this fact already tells us much about the style of 
Suárez’s philosophy, it also allows us to identify the principal schools of thought 
that shaped and inspired his work. Principal among these are Thomist Aristote-
lianism (which is cited the most often), the so-called Second Scholasticism, 
Philosophical Augustinianism, the Fathers of the Church, Platonism and Nomi-
nalism. The table below presents the exact number of quotes in the Disputatio-













1. Aristotle    1735 
2. Thomas 
Aquinas 
   1008 
  3. DunsScotus  363 
   4. Augustine 334 
 5. Cajetan   299 
 6. Soncinas   192 
   7. Averroes 179 
 8. Durando   153 
 9. Ferrariense   124 
                                                     
3     Cf. Luis González Alonso-Getino, “El centenario de Suárez”, La Ciencia Tomista 15 (1917): 
381–390. 
4     Édouard Hugon, Les vingt-quatre thèses thomistes (Paris: Téqui, 1946). 
5     Cf. Jesús Iturrioz, Estudios sobre la metafísica de Suárez (Madrid: Ediciones Fax, 1949), 147–
148. 
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 10. Capreole   115 
 11. Fonseca   114 
 12. Iavello   97 
   13. Albert the 
Great 
96 
  14. Henry of 
Ghent 
 95 
   15. Plato 92 
   16. Gregory of 
Rimini 
90 
   17. Gabriel 
Biel 
86 
   18. Avicenna 84 
  19. Giles of 
Rome 
 78 
   20. Herveo 
Natalis 
77 
 21. Domingo 
di Soto 
  75 
  22. Alexander 
of Hales 
 71 
   23. Damascene 71 
   24. Ockham 67 




   26. Alexander 
of Aphrodisias 
52 
 27. Aureolus   46 
   28. Simplicius 41 
 29. Antonius 
Andreas 
  40 
  30. Bonaventure  38 
   31. Marsilius 
of Inghen 
37 
   32. Anselm of 
Canterbury 
36 
  33. Ricardus de 
Mediavilla 
 34 
   34. Boethius 33 
Our interest for the moment lies primarily in investigating the influence that 
Philosophical Augustinianism –and in particular the thought of Duns Scotus and 
Henry of Ghent– had on the thought of Francisco Suárez. In order to do this we 
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will first identify certain themes that are characteristic of the Augustinian-
Franciscan school, and then examine to what extent these influenced the philo-
sophy of the Doctor Eximius. This analysis will then enable us to understand 
why Suárez distanced himself from Thomas on key issues. 
 
1. Medieval Augustinianism 
While the Philosophical Augustinianism that had dominated Europe for 
centuries was in decline by the time Suárez assumed his role as magister in 
philosophy and theology, it was far from dead. Its continued presence was due 
in large part to the influence of Duns Scotus and William of Ockham who drew 
their terminology and fundamental ideas from none other than the Augustinians 
William of Auvergne and Henry of Ghent. It is well known, for example, that 
the great universities of Spain, including the University of Salamanca where 
Suárez studied, divided their philosophy curriculum into Thomist, Scotist, and 
Nominalist (or Ockhamist) sections, and that even the Dominican ‘Thomists’ of 
the time believed that it was possible to include Thomas and Scotus into a larger 
synthesis. 
Born as a reaction to the dangers that Aristotelean physics and metaphysics, 
particularly in their Averroist interpretation, posed to the faith, medieval 
Augustinianism was not a school of philosophy in the strict sense of the term. It 
consisted primarily of a loosely organized set of doctrines united by the desire 
to defend Christian science from what it saw as the profane and naturalistic 
contaminationof Greek-Arab thought. The famous 1277 Paris condemnations, 
fruit of this new Augustinianism, were thus only a single episode in a much 
longer and at times markedly bitter encounter between two opposing visions: 
the sacred sciences, the faculty of theology and the ‘truth of the Gospel’ on the 
one hand, and philosophy, the faculty of arts, and what appeared to some as 
‘ancient paganism’ on the other6. In fact, the condemnations of Paris were soon 
followed by events in England. On 18 March 1277 Robert Kilwardby, the 
Bishop of Canterbury, and then his successor, John Peckham, on 29 October 
1284, condemned not only the errors of Averroism, but also certain alleged 
errors of Thomas Aquinas. Principal among these were Thomas’ theses on the 
unicity of the substantial form and, as a consequence of this, of the reality of 
prime matter in the strict sense, i.e. as a matter that was pure potency without 
any actuality. All of this shows how medieval Augustinianism, and Scotism 
                                                     
6     Cf. Ferdinand van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIIIe siècle (Louvain-Paris: Èditions de 
l’Instituit Supérieur de Philosophie, 1991), 424 and Étienne Gilson, La filosofia nel Medioevo (Firenze: 
La Nuova Italia, 1978), 540. 
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after it, were largely the efforts of theologians to combat the ‘rationalism’ that 
they believed had compromised the faculty of arts and which was being aided 
by Thomism, a rationalism which alleged was destroying the profound 
relationship between faith and reason, that was a cornerstone of Christian belief. 
What then were the central ideas of this current of thought? According to 
the above-mentioned Franciscan John Peckham, a chief proponent of Philoso-
phical Augustinianism, the movement was characterized by the following 
positions7: 
a) The pre-eminence of the good over the truth, and as a consequence of 
this of the will over the intellect, with regard to the divine causality (in 
creation and providence), causality of creatures, human happiness and 
the nature of liberum arbitrium; 
b) Divine illumination as the cause of knowledge and because of this the 
notion of being (esse) as light and of divine being as infinite and 
uncreated light; 
c) The principle according to which prime matter possesses an actuality of 
its own independently of the substantial form. From this principle 
another thesis follows: the multiplicity of substantial forms in an ens 
and hence also in man; 
d) The individuation of the human soul independently of its union with the 
body; 
e) The impossibility of the creation of the world without a temporal 
beginning; 
f) The identity of the soul and its faculties; 
g) The interpretation of the sciences (artes) and of philosophy as subordi-
nate to sacred science and theology.  
Our concern here is to point out the presence of the doctrine of the actuality 
of prime matter in Philosophical Augustinianism, because it is this idea that 
most closely resembles the position of Suárez and which marks his departure 
from the thought of Aquinas. In fact, as we shall soon see, Suárez derives his 
unique ideas in the fields of the theory of knowledge (Suárez believed, for 
instance, that an immediate intellectual knowledge of the individual was possi-
                                                     
7    Cf. John Peckham, “Letter of 1 January 1285, number 625”, in Charles Trice  Martin, ed., 
Registrum epistolarum fratris Joannis Peckham, archiepiscopi Cantuariensis, Rolls Series 77,  vol. III 
(London: Longman & Co., 1885), 870-872, where Peckham describes the doctrines disputed by the fo-
llowers of Augustine and Aristotle.  
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ble), of metaphysics (he held that prime matter had its own act of being), and of 
philosophy of nature from this starting point.  
In order to investigate how this doctrine arrived to Suárez we need to trace 
its development in the two Augustinian authors he cites most frequently –Duns 
Scotus and Henry of Ghent– and we therefore briefly analyse these philosophers 
below in chronological order.  
 
2. Henry of Ghent 
Henry of Ghent (1217-1293) was probably the chief representative of the 
Philosophical Augustinianism which characterized the secular clergy of the 
University of Paris and which was so bitterly opposed to Aristotelian Scholasti-
cism and Thomas Aquinas. He was one of the few secular magisters who was 
still present at the University of Paris when the mendicant Franciscans and 
Domenicans arrived there, and in 1277 Étienne Tempier thus named him a 
member of the theological commission in charge of investigating the orthodoxy 
of the new doctrines being taught at the school. Within a few weeks the commi-
ssion came out with its judgment: 219 thesis, many of which did not even 
represent the thought of their censured authors, were condemned. 
Henry was the author of several Quodlibeta and a Summa Theologica. His 
metaphysics is clearly close to that of Avicenna: like him, he defines metaphy-
sics as “the science of being in as much as being.” Being (esse) is what is first 
offered to the intellect; while it is thus impossible to define, everyone knows –
according to Henry– what ‘that which is’ means. To the mind this ‘that which 
is’ is presented as a ‘thing’ (res) and as ‘necessary’ (necesse). The ‘thing’, or 
res, or essence is the ‘that which’, while the ‘necessary’ is that which necessarily 
is what it is. From here it follows that the first division of being is into necessary 
being and possible being. The possible has its cause in the necessary and in this 
way, through a series of relative necessaries, one arrives to the First necessary. 
Hence the necessary is ‘something which is being (esse) itself,’ while the 
possible is ‘that which is something which may or may not be.’ 
It is obvious that God, uncreated being, is necessary being, while the 
creature is possible being. Metaphysics, the science of being in as much as 
being, is thus based on these two notions. Possible being, or in other words ‘so-
mething to which being can agree’, includes everything what falls into the cate-
gories. The proper (possible) being of the creature is its essence which is a divine 
idea and hence a participation in the divine essence; in as much as it belongs to 
the creature, however, it is not divine but has something that Henry calls ‘the 
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being of the essence’ (esse essentiae). This is in fact the doctrine that character-
rizes Henry’s thought, and which will continually reappear until it makes its 
appearance in Suárez: the identification of the being (esse) of a creature with its 
essence, and hence of the order of essence with the order of existence. This 
identification works to the disadvantage of the latter because, as the essentialist 
thesis of Avicenna had already shown, the order of existence necessarily tends 
towards accidentalization in such a system. And it is thus hardly surprising that 
Henry is forced to distinguish between the esse essentiae and the esse existentiae 
of the creature, with the first coming from the divine idea and the second from 
the free will of the Creator. But since the distinction between being and action 
in God is only one of reason, the difference between these two principles in the 
creature also reduces to one of only reason, a doctrine we will come across again 
in Suárez. 
 
3. Duns Scotus 
The most important work of Duns Scotus (1266-1308) is his Commentary 
on the Sentences, also called the Ordinatio or Opus oxoniense. Other works 
include the Quaestiones in metaphysicam, the Quaestiones quodlibetales, and 
the De primo principio, an outstanding fact given that he died at only 42. 
The object of metaphysics according to Scotus is ‘being in as much as 
being,’ where this is opposed to any limitation or contraction of being (esse) to 
a specific mode. This being is completely abstract and indeterminate, a notion 
that –precisely because of its non-determination and abstraction– can be applied 
to everything that exists. In contrast to the Thomist notion of being as a funda-
mental and central act, Scotus understands being as a natura communis which 
is predicated univocally of all reality, from the creature to the Creator. In fact, it 
is this univocal nature which allows man to think about the different types of 
reality he encounters: finite and infinite, contingent and necessary, human and 
divine are simply the intrinsic modes of univocal being. This set-up already 
allows us to guess how Scotus approaches the problem of God: to arrive to the 
knowledge of a first principle which causes the sensible world one no longer 
needs to start from sensible reality but simply from being itself. 
Being in as much as being has various properties. The first of these are the 
possible determinations, or ‘modes,’ which we have mentioned above, and 
which are always nothing less than being itself. In other words, while being may 
have different modifications, it is always intrinsically the same. The first and 
most fundamental modes are finite and infinite, a division that includes all 
further divisions of being and is anterior to the Aristotelean division into the ten 
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categories: while the categories are determinations and hence limitations of 
being, being itself nonetheless enters fully into the finite modality. 
With regard to the constitution of material objects, Scotus asks whether 
materia, understood as a positive entity, actually exists on its own apart from 
the forma. His answer is affirmative: the composite would not be what it is if 
one of its constituent elements –its matter– did not have a positive reality or 
existence in itself. If matter is subject, it needs to be something. Scotus thus 
concludes that “matter possesses a certain reality outside of the intellect and its 
cause, in virtue of which it can receive only those substantial forms which are 
simply acts”8.It is thus clear that for Scotus matter has a certain being or 
existence in itself –even if only in a minimum way– and that this is what allows 
it to function as the subject of the act which the substantial form contributes to 
the composite. This being of the matter is distinct from that of the form however; 
it lacks all determination and qualification. Matter which is determinable, and 
form which is determination, are thus related realities whose union occurs 
through a “substantial link”9. 
The fundamental reason why Scotus conceives of matter in this way is 
linked to his understanding of creation: if matter was truly created by God, it 
cannot not have a certain internal and intrinsic reality; Aristotle’s conception of 
matter as a pure potency completely actualized by the form was only due to his 
ignorance of the fact of creation. We thus see how Scotus’ theory is an attempt 
to adapt the Aristotelean concept of matter to the exigencies of Christian faith, 
and in particular to the notion of creation. 
The consequences of this theory affect Scotus’ idea of how individuation 
takes place as well. For if matter is not truly prime matter because it already 
exists with its own act, then the form which actualizes it is not truly a substantial 
form either. The path for a series of progressive determinations through forma-
litates is thus opened up. The last of these formalitates is what Scotus calls the 
haecceitas: the definitive perfection of the substantial form, the definitive and 
last actualization of matter, the form, and the composite.  
The differences between this vision and that of Thomas are already evident. 
Instead of the composition of prime matter and substantial form we have the 
composition of natura comunis and haecceitas. What about Scotus’ idea of the 
distinction between essence and existence? Without dedicating too much 
attention to this question, the solution of Scotus is clear: “an essence outside of 
its cause and which has no being through which it would be an essence is, in my 
                                                     
8     John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, II, d.12 q.1 n.13. 
9    John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, II, d.12 q.1 n.3. 
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opinion, a contradiction”10. Essence therefore, if it is real and not just logical, if 
it is outside of its (creative) cause, must have its own being; and with this the 
distinction between essence and existence collapses. This is even clearer in the 
Ordinatio: “it is simply false that existence is different from essence”11. 
Comparing the relationship between essence-existence to that of potency-
operation leads to the same conclusion: “It is false to say that existence is related 
to essence as an operation is to potency because existence and essence are 
identical”12. The solution of Scotus to the problem of the relation between 
essence and existence is thus that the latter is only a mode of the former; their 
distinction is modal, but there is no true composition between them. Existence 
is simply an intrinsic mode of essence13. 
 
4. Synthesis 
The principal ideas that Philosophical Augustinianism gave to Suárez were 
thus the following: 
1. Essentialism, which gives ontological weight to essence rather than 
existence, and which Suárez learnt from Henry of Ghent and Scotus. 
This essence is understood as a divine idea which is ‘placed’ into 
existence outside of the divine creative essence when it has existence 
joined to it. It is this addition that determines the conditional and non-
necessary character of the existence of the creature. Following these 
authors Suárez develops a concept of being that is highly abstract (as a 
essentia realis) whose first division is between finite and infinite (or 
contingent and necessary). 
2. The first division in being as that between finite and infinite, an idea 
taken from Scotus. This division precedes the division of being into the 
ten categories, with these being reduced to the properties of only finite 
being, i.e. of the creature. This abstract imposition means that a study 
of reality cannot begin from physical nature but only from the meta-
physical notion of creation; any ascent in metaphysics from creature to 
God is thus rejected in favour of a descending metaphysics of creation. 
The need for physical proofs for the existence of God based on move-
ment thus disappears and we are left only with metaphysical proofs 
                                                     
10   John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, II, d.12 q.1 n.16. 
11    John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, IV, d.13 q.1 n. 38. 
12    John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, II, d.16 q.1 n. 10. 
13   Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 8 nn. 108-111. 
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based on causality. The Aristotelean ‘quidquid movetur ab alio move-
tur’ is thus replaced with Suárez’s ‘omne quod fit ex aliquo fit.’ 
3. The doubling of the order of essence and existence, taken from Henry 
of Ghent. This is of course a consequence of essentialism and leads to 
the accidentalization of existence.  
4. The positive reality of matter, inherited from Scotus. This doctrine 
necessarily endangers the metaphysical unity of the composite, which 
is now the fruit only of a type of external amalgamation: either the ‘link 
of union’ of Scotus, or the ‘mode of union’ of Suárez. 
5. That the distinction between essence and existence is only one of reason 
and not a real distinction, following Henry of Ghent and Scotus.  
6. And finally Giles of Rome, in spite of his opposing theory on the real 
distinction between existence and essence, helped confirm Suárez in his 
essentialism through his idea of the ‘realization’ of essence through 
existence which is something added to it (aliquid sibi additum). 
  
II. THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SUÁREZ AND THOMAS 
Our study has thus far highlighted the similarities between medieval Au-
gustinianism and Suárez. Section II of this paper explores how these similarities 
led to important differences between Suárez and Thomas, a result hardly 
surprising given that Philosophical Augustinianism, as we have already pointed 
out, was in large measure a theological reaction to the Aristotelianism of which 
Thomas was a staunch defender. But this section also has a second goal: to 
demonstrate out how these ‘points of friction’ between Suárez and Thomas were 
to have a determining influence on the origin of modern philosophy, an idea 
largely unexplored in current academic research. The paradox is, in fact, that 
what is most characteristic of modern philosophy – its theory of matter and of 
knowledge – is actually very similar to ideas espoused by Augustinian and 
Franciscan philosophy in the late Middle Ages. This also explains why modern 
philosophy received such a stimulus from the doctrines of Ockham and his 
school, another system that has much in common with Suárez. 
The most important ‘points of friction’ that we wish to analyse concern 
Suárez’s doctrine on material substance and the distinction between essence and 
existence and act and potency. This chapter thus studies Suárez’s understanding 
of the different levels of composition in material being: matter and form, 
substance and accident, essence and existence, and finally potency and act. 
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1. The problem of substantial composition: prime matter and 
substantial form14 
1.1. The attribution of an ‘act of being’ to matter and its consequences: the 
substantialization of matter and the accidental union between matter and 
form 
One area of great importance where the influence of Philosophical Augusti-
nianism and its doctrine of universal hylemorphism on Suárez is evident is in 
his theory of the accidental union of matter and form and hence his rejection      
of the true unity of material substances. The basis for this position is his 
understanding of prime matter: he sees it as a type of subsistent res that then 
enters into relation with form. But a prime matter that is subsistent, and hence 
some type of substance, can only enter into an accidental union with form, which 
is thus now considered accidental to matter and material substance. In this way 
Suárez distances himself from Thomas and Aristotle for whom prime matter is 
not only potency (in as much as matter) but pure potency (in as much as prime), 
and hence devoid of any act. Instead he adopts a position much closer to that of 
Scotus for whom matter already has a proper act of being (actus entitativus), 
which while not being a formal act (actus formalis) is nonetheless sufficient to 
make it subsist as a thing (res). In this sense, it should be noted that the 
distinction between actus entitativus and actus formalis is wholly of scotistic 
origin. 
Because of this Suárez no longer sees matter and form as metaphysical 
principles but as ‘things’ (res). He is in fact quite explicit on this point: “In 
consequence, matter is distinguished from form as one thing from another thing. 
This is certain; and since the composition of matter and form is real and physical 
[…], it follows that the composition is between two things”15. Form is thus no 
longer the metaphysical principle that confers being (esse) to prime matter; the 
latter already possess its own actuality even if, according to Suárez, its act of 
being is not sufficiently strong to allow it to exist naturally without the form16. 
 
 
                                                     
14    Cf. Francisco Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae (DM), 13. 
15   Francisco Suárez, DM, 13, 4, 5: “Distinguitur ergo materia a forma tamquam res a re. Et 
confirmatur; nam compositio substantiae ex materia et forma est realis et physica [...] ergo ex duabus 
rebus”. The emphasis is ours.  
16    Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 15, 8-9. 
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1.2. The precarious union between matter and form occurs through what 
Suárez calls a “mode of substantial union” 
It is clear that the union of two things that already exist (or two things that 
have their own actus entitativus) cannot produce a thing that is truly one. Suárez 
thus replaces the profound substantial union between Thomas’ metaphysical 
principles of matter and form with the idea of an accidental union between “two 
things” which enter into a physical composition. This composition is in fact 
more of an aggregation than a true unity, and it takes place through what Suárez 
can only call a mode (or type) of substantial union17. It is significative how 
Suárez understands this union by analogy: he claims that “matter and form are 
not a single being, but form a single being, just as many people are not a people 
but form a people”18. In fact, while admitting that matter has a “transcendental 
relation” towards form, Suárez nonetheless holds that it conserves its own being 
even in the composite. In such case the unity between matter and form can be 
reached only by means of a third ontological instance (the “mode of substantial 
union” that Suárez speaks about), because two things in act can never truly 
become one in act. It is thus more clear than ever that the union between matter 
and form, in spite of being called a ‘type of substantial union’ is actually an 
accidental one19. 
1.3. From the extrinsic nature of the union between matter and form to the 
dualism of the Cartesian “res extensa” 
The accidental nature of the union between matter and form implies that the 
two principles are actually extrinsic to each other. Composite material substance 
is thus divided into two halves extrinsically joined together: a purely material 
substance on the one hand and a purely formal substance on the other. The 
tendency toward dualism is thus strong in Suárez, particularly in the case of man 
where the union of matter and form (which is the spiritual soul) is between two 
substances whose natures are characterized by opposing attributes. In this way, 
Suárez opens the door to a new anthropological dualism which was almost 
immediately taken up and made more explicit by Descartes. 
 
 
                                                     
17    Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 34, 4, 32. 
18    Francisco Suárez, DM, 4, 3, 16. 
19    Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 4, 4, 19. 
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1.4. The immediate inherence of the accident of quantity in matter instead 
of in the composite: further approximations to the Cartesian “res extensa” 
Having provided prime matter with a proper act of being and so approxi-
mating it to a substance, Suárez then insists that the accident of quantity inheres 
directly in matter: “Prime matter, in virtue of its being, is a sufficient material 
cause for the accidental forms that are proportionate to it; this is primarily and 
principally [the accident of] quantity, and through quantity all the rest [of the 
accidents]”20. Or again, “matter is the proper and only subject in which quantity 
inheres”21 because “with its own being it is capable of partially subsisting by 
itself”22. This is of course a clear departure from Thomas for whom accidents 
inhere not in prime matter but in the composite of matter and form, i.e. in the 
material substance. But this doctrine of Suárez is also important for another 
reason: it shows how close he comes to Descartes’ notion of material substance 
as res extensa, i.e. as a ‘something’ that exists and whose essence consists in the 
attribute of spatial extension, or in other words of extension in length, breadth, 
and depth23. Suárez’s subsisting prime matter with extension is clearly on the 
path towards the more articulated Cartesian position. 
 
2. The problem of accidental composition: substance and accident24 
2.1. The weakening of substantial unity in material substances also leads to 
a rupture at the level of accidental composition: since the accident is also 
already an “ens”, it can only determine substance extrinsically 
Since Suárez does not hold that the being of material substance proceeds 
from a single actus essendi, communicated to matter through form according to 
the principle forma dat esse rei materiali, and instead sees it as the aggregation 
of already subsisting matter and substantial form, it is hardly surprising that he 
also rejects the idea that accidents are ontologically ‘nourished’ by the one act 
of being of the substanc e. This is only logical: since the form does not transmit 
                                                     
20     Francisco Suárez, DM, 14, 3, 10. 
21    Francisco Suárez, DM, 14, 3, 36: “Dico ergo [...] materiam esse posse et de facto aliquando 
esse proprium subiectum cui soli quantitas inhaeret”. 
22   Francisco Suárez, DM, 14, 3, 57: “Ad primam enim iam saepe dictum est materiam habere 
suum esse proprium, quod, licet in genere substantiae sit incompletum, tamen comparatione accidentis 
est esse simpliciter ac per se subsistens partialiter”. 
23    Cf. René Descartes, Principia Philosophiæ, I, 53: “Et quidem ex quolibet attributo substantia 
cognoscitur; sed una tamen est cujusque substantiæ præcipua proprietas, quæ ipsius naturam 
essentiamque constituit, et ad quam aliæ omnes referuntur. Nempe extensio in longum, latum et pro-
fundum, substantiæ corporeæ naturam constituit”. 
24    Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 14 and 32. 
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the act of being to matter, neither does the composite transmit being to accidents. 
In fact, the opposite is true: like matter, accidents too already have their own 
being, even if this is ‘smaller’ than that of the substance (Suárez calls the acci-
dent an entitas diminuta). But if accidents have their own being before union 
with substance, then like matter they already are substances, even if ‘smaller 
substances’. And the union between two substances (the accident and the 
composite) can only be extrinsic, with the two forming an aggregate. 
This position is of course tempered by the admission that the proper being 
of an accident is so weak that it needs a subject to be sustained: “the accident 
requires a material cause […] because its being is so diminished [entitatem ita 
diminutam] that it is not apt for subsistence and needs a subject to sustain 
it”25.The fact remains, however, that if the accident has its own being, even if a 
weak one, then it truly is an ens in its own right, like matter it is a substance, 
even if in some sense an incomplete and imperfect one. And in as much as it is 
a substance it cannot inhere in another substance but can only be extrinsically 
added to it. Strictly speaking then, accidents cannot be said to inhere in 
substance but only to adhere to them. 
2.2. The“mode of substantial union” is thus mirrored by a “mode of acci-
dental union” 
Suárez is thus obliged to postulate what he calls a “mode of accidental 
union” between substance and accident that attempts to bridge the gap between 
the two and save, in as much as possible, the precarious union between two ens 
which already subsist in virtue of their own act of being26.We can see how 
radically different this system is to that of Thomas for whom the union between 
substance and accident is immediately guaranteed by a single actus essendi 
common to both. In short, just as the substantial nature of prime matter jeo-
pardizes substantial union, so too does the substantial nature of the accident 
fragment the unity of substance at the second level of composition of material 




                                                     
25    Francisco Suárez, DM, 14, 1, 3: “At vero accidens ex praecisa et communi ratione accidentis 
postulat materialem causam, quia dicit entitatem ita diminutam, ut natura sua sit inepta ad subsistendum, 
ac proinde indigentem aliquo subiecto sustentante”. Cf. also DM, 14, 1, 8. 
26    Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 34, 4, 34. 
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2.3 An accident which is extrinsic to substance does not manifest it but 
conceals it: towards a Kantian phenomenism 
It is clear that the ontological disintegration of substance that we have 
described has consequences in other areas of philosophy. Primary among these 
is in the theory of knowledge. For if, according to the logic of the ‘Copernican 
revolution’ (or of a philosophy of immanence in general), the accident (‘that 
which is in another’) is transformed into a mere phenomenon (‘that which             
is manifested of the other’), then it paradoxically follows that the path to 
knowledge of substance is not favoured but actually hindered and even closed 
off27. This is hardly surprising: if the accident is already an ens from an 
ontological point of view, then it cannot provide knowledge of something other 
than itself. In this way access to the substance is blocked by precisely that 
element which was supposed to manifest it, i.e. the accident-phenomenon.  
The result is that man has knowledge only of phenomena, of what is pre-
sented to his senses, which is something unintelligible and inconclusive, while 
the substance, or in other words the real, remains a mysterious and unknown 
noumenon to him. The phenomena reflect only themselves and are cognitively 
independent of a reality that has become fragmentary and unable to provide 
anything more than a distorted chimera of cognitive information about itself. 
This is of course the beginning and foundation of that theory of knowledge 
called phenomenism, a theory prepared by Locke and Hume and culminated in 
Kant, which profoundly marked the development of Western philosophy and 
the demise of metaphysics. 
 
3. The problem of composition at the level of essence and existence28 
Suárez’s Disputatio XXXI, entitled “On the essence of finite being as such, 
on its existence, and on distinction between both,” contains 14 sections which 
can be divided into 4 parts: 
a. The first part (sections 1a – 6a) analyses the distinction between essence 
and existence, giving special attention to the question of essence; 
b. The second part (sections 7a – 10a) is dedicated to the study of existence, 
its causes, and its effects; 
                                                     
27    This transformation occurs in a philosophy of consciousness, in which substance becomes the 
subject of consciousness and accident a moment of that consciousness. One can therefore say that what 
was classically expressed by the binomial accident-substance is thus transformed into the binomial 
phenomenon-consciousness.  
28    Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 31. 
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c. The third part (sections 11a – 13a) studies the different types of 
existence, the separability of essence and existence, and their types of 
composition; 
d. And the fourth part (section 14a) considers the relations of dependence 
on God in created being. 
Our interest lies primarily in some ideas contained in this long section: 
3.1. Existence, or in other words, the state of actuality of essence  
Suárez begins by immediately identifying esse with “the actual existence of 
things”29. In fact, “essence” does not express something real which possesses 
existence “outside its causes”, nor does it express an actuality by which essence 
is constituted outside its causes. “Actual existence” only signifies that a created 
thing is posited into existence from nothingness30. 
3.2. Essence: the state of pure possibility, a “nothingness” which is none-
theless apt for creation 
If esse is actual existence, then what is essence since it has no positive 
character? “The essence of the creature, i.e. the creature itself before being pro-
duced by God, does not by itself possess any reality, and if we thus leave aside 
the being of existence [esse existentiae], essence is not a reality at all but is 
absolutely nothing”31. Nonetheless, at least according to Capriolo, the great 
commentator of Thomas, this “nothing” of pre-created essence has a “type of 
aptitude or non-repugnance with regard to being produced by God”32. It is 
precisely this aptitude that distinguishes essentia realis which is not yet created 
but creatable from what is fictitious and impossible. In this way Suárez equates 
real essence with possible essence, or simply the possible. And then he adds: “in 
this way this essence is called real, even before being produced, not because it 
contains a true actuality in itself but because it can become real by receiving 
from its cause [God] true being. This possibility only expresses, on the part of 
essence, a non-repugnance to being produced; on the part of the extrinsic cause, 
on the other hand, it signifies the power of production”33. Before being created 
                                                     
29     Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 1, 2. 
30    Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 1, 2. 
31      Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 2, 1: “Principio statuendum est essentiam creaturae, seu creaturam 
de se et priusquam a Deo fiat, nullum habere in se verum esse reale, et in hoc sensu, praeciso esse 
existentiae, essentiam non esse rem aliquam, sed omnino esse nihil”. 
32     Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 2, 2: “[...] ut ex parte creaturae dicat quamdam aptitudinem, seu 
potius non repugnantiam, ut in tali esse a Deo producatur”.The emphasis is ours. 
33     Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 2, 2: “Atque hoc etiam modo dicitur talis essentia, antequam fiat, 
realis, non propia ac vera realitate quam in se actu habeat, sed quia fieri potest realis, recipiendo veram 
entitatem a sua causa, quae possibilitas (ut statim latius dicam) ex parte illius solum dicit non re-
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by God essence is thus an ontological “nothingness” which nonetheless can be 
created by Him. Suárez calls this “possible nothingness” an “objective po-
tency”34. 
3.3. An important Suárez’s principle: Being in act (existence) and being in 
potency (essence) are distinguished as being and non-being 
Before proceeding further, we should ask what the difference between 
being (ens) in act and being in potency is in the creature for Suárez. Since 
according to him being (ens) is synonymous for essence, this is equivalent to 
asking how essence in act and potency differ. 
We have already seen that before being created essence is a “creatable 
nothingness” called “objective potency”. But Suárez then adds to this the idea 
that “in created things, being in potency and being in act are immediately and 
formally distinguished as ens et non ens simpliciter”35. Hence the distinction 
between essence in potency and essence in act is actually a distinction of reason: 
“we are not speaking in fact of two realities but of a single reality, which is 
considered and compared by the intellect as if it were two”36. 
3.4. Objective potency 
This “does not consist in a positive state or mode of being, and if one 
prescinds from the power of the agent implies only negation, and concretely the 
negation of not yet being this type of potency”37. 
3.5. What does essence in act (i.e. existence) add to essence in potency? 
One could say that essence in act adds existence to essence in potency. But 
this way of speaking would be equivocal for Suárez, because in reality all that 
is added is a difference of reason. This is because a real addition can only be 
made to a being that is already real; and since, as we have seen, essence is 
                                                     
pugnantiam ut fiat; ex parte vero extrinsecae causae dicit virtutem ad illam efficiendam”. The emphasis 
is ours. 
34    Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 2, 2: “Atque eodem modo et ratione, esse quod appellant essentiae, 
ante effectionem seu creationem divinam, solum est esse potentiale obiectivum (ut multi loquuntur, de 
quo statim), seu per denominationem extrinsecam a potentia Dei et non repugnantiam ex parte essentiae 
creabilis”. The emphasis is ours. 
35    Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 3, 1: “[...] in rebus creatis ens in potentia et in actu immediate ac 
formaliter distingui tamquam ens et non ens simpliciter”. 
36     Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 3, 1: “Quae distinctio [...] ab aliis vero vocatur distinctio rationis, 
quia non sunt duae res, sed una tantum, quae per intellectum concipitur et comparatur ac si essent duae”. 
37    Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 3, 4: “Relinquitur ergo ens in potentia ut sic non diceres tatum aut 
modum positivum entis, sed potius praeter denominationem a potentia agentis includere negationem, 
scilicet, quod nondum actu prodierit a tali potentia”. 
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potency is only a “nothingness,” its ‘properties’ cannot be real either, but only 
additions of reason38.  
3.6. What is existence? Existence is that by which a thing (i.e. essence) is 
formally constituted in act outside its causes 
Up until now Suárez has spoken about being as essence. But he then asks 
about existence, i.e. that by which essence is constituted as actual. Existence is, 
in fact, that by which essence is posited outside its causes to become actualized, 
or in other words, that which allows essence to abandon its state of ontological 
nothingness and begin to be something. “Existence is that by which a thing is 
formally constituted in act outside its causes”39, Suárez says, remembering of 
course that existence cannot be really distinguished from essence. 
3.7. The distinction between essence and existence cannot be real 
It is already clear that the distinction between essence and existence in 
Suárez cannot be real. “The created essence which is actually constituted outside 
its causes is not really distinguished from existence as if they were two realities 
or two distinct beings”40. The distinction is only one of reason, just as the 
distinction between ens and nothingness is one of reason. In fact, as we have 
already seen, essence in potency and essence in act are related as ens and no-
thingness. “Being in potency is not really being at all, but nothing. It expresses 
on the part of the creatable things only non-repugnance or logical potency”41. 
3.8. How does the intellect distinguish between essence and existence? 
The intellect can distinguish between things which are not truly separated. 
It can also conceive of creatures in abstraction, without regard to their actual 
existence. This is because it is not contradictory to conceive of non-necessary 
nature without divine efficacy, and hence without actual existence. This means 
that “in a thing conceived of in this way, if we prescind from actuality, there is 
something which is considered to be totally intrinsic and necessary, something 
like a first constitutive of that thing, which offers itself as the object of that 
conception; this is what we call the essence of the thing, because without it the 
thing cannot be conceived. All the predicates which are said of this thing belong 
                                                     
38    Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 3, 5. 
39    Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 4, 6: “Ergo huiusmodi esse quo res formaliter constituitur actu 
extra causas est existentia”. 
40     Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 6, 1: “Dicendum est enim primo essentiam creatam in actu extra 
causas constitutam non distingui realiter ab existentia, ita ut sint duae res seu entitates distinctae”. 
41      Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 6, 13: “Quod addo ut tollatur aequivocatio de entitate in potentia, 
quae revera non est entitas, sed nihil, et ex parte rei creabilis solum dicit non repugnantiam vel potentiam 
logicam”. 
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to it in an absolutely necessary and essential way, because it cannot exist or be 
conceived without them […]. From the opposite point of view, we negate the 
actual existence or that actual being belongs to essence”42. 
3.9. The distinction between essence and existence cannot be real because 
essence and existence are the same thing, but conceived of by the mind as 
two states (possible and actual) 
In conclusion we can say that for Suárez essence and existence are actually 
the same reality, the only difference between them coming from how that reality 
is conceived. When seen as essence, the reality is called a quidditas, since 
essence is what defines or describes what the thing is and which particular grade 
or order of being it belongs to. In as much as existence, it is seen as something 
which exists in reality outside its causes. The foundation of this distinction 
between essence and existence is the fact that created beings do not have 
existence in themselves but could also not exist43.  
                                                     
42     Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 6, 15: “Ex hoc autem modo concipiendi nostro fit ut in re sic 
concepta, praescindendo ab actuali entitate, aliquid consideretur tamquam omnino intrinsecum et ne-
cessarium et quasi primum constitutivum illius rei quae tali conceptione obiicitur; et hoc vocamus 
essentiam rei, quia sine illa nec concipi potest; et praedicata quae inde sumuntur, dicuntur ei omnino 
necessario et essentialiter convenire, quia sine illis neque esse neque concipi potest, quamvis in re non 
semper conveniant, sed quando res existit. Atque ex opposite ratione, ipsum actu existere seu esse 
actualem entitatem negamus esse de essentia, quia praescindi potest a praedicto conceptu, et de facto 
potest non convenire creaturae prout tali conceptui obiicitur”. 
43    Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 6, 23: “Dicendum ergo est eamdem rem esse essentiam et 
existentiam, concipi autem sub ratione essentiae, quatenus ratione eius constituitur res sub tali genere 
et specie. Est enim essentia, ut supra, disp. II, sect. 4, declaravimus, id quo primo aliquid constituitur 
intra latitudine mentis realis, ut distinguitur ab ente ficto, et in unoquoque particulari ente essentia eius 
dicitur id ratione cuius in tali gradu et ordine entium constituitur. Quomodo dixit Augustinus, XII de 
Civitate, c. 2: Auctor essentiarum omnium aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus, atque ita naturas 
essentiarum gradibus ordinavit. Atque hac ratione solet essentia quidditatis nomine significari, quia illa 
est quae per definitionem explicatur, vel aliqua descriptione, per quam declaramus quidnam res sit 
cuiusve naturae. At vero haec eadem res concipitur sub ratione existentiae, quatenus est ratio essendi in 
rerum natura et extra causas. Nam, quia essentia creaturae non hoc necessario habet ex vi sua ut sit 
actualis entitas, ideo, quando recipit entitatem suam, concipimus aliquid esse in ipsa quod sit formalis 
ratio essendi extra causas; et illud sub tali ratione appellamus existentiam quod, licet in re non sit aliud 
ab ipsamet entitate essentiae, sub diversa tamen ratione et descriptione a nobis concipitur, quod ad 
distinctionem rationis sufficit. Huius autem distinctionis fundamentum est, quod res creatae de se non 
habent esse et possunt interdum non esse. Ex hoc enim fit ut essentiam creaturae nos concipiamus ut 
indifferentem ad esse vel non esse actu, quae indifferentia non est per modum abstractionis negativae, 
sed praecisivae; et ideo, quamvis ratio essentiae absolute concipiatur a nobis etiam in ente in potentia, 
tamen multo magis intelligimus reperiri in ente in actu, licet in eo praescindamus totum id quod nece-
ssario et essentialiter ei convenit, ab ipsa actualitate essendi; et hoc modo concipimus essentiam sub 
ratione essentiae ut potentiam; existentiam vero ut actum eius. Hac ergo ratione dicimus hanc distinctio-
nem rationis habere in re aliquod fundamentum, quod non est aliqua actualis distinctio quae in re 
intercedat, sed imperfectio creaturae, quae, hoc ipso quod ex se non habet esse et illud potest ab alio 
recipere, occasionem praebet huic nostrae conceptioni”. 
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3.10. Four other interesting ideas contained in this section 
a) In XI, 22 Suárez asks whether existence is the last or the first actuality of 
ens. For some, including the author of the Quaestio unica de anima, a.6, ad 2, 
attributed to Thomas by Cajetan, existence is the last act and the last actuality 
of a thing. Other Thomists hold that it is the first act of a thing. Suárez attempts 
to answer this question by holding that the diversity of opinion is due to the 
different meanings of the word. This solution seems to be a weak one, however, 
for it fails to take into account Thomas’ doctrine in the Summa Theologiae 
where esseis seen as the act of all acts of a thing. Thomas in fact affirms that 
“esse is what is most intimate and most penetrating in every thing”44, and that 
“being is what is most perfect in every thing because it is compared to all the 
others as act and nothing is in act except in as much as it is. Hence esse is the 
actuality of all things and of all forms. It is not in fact compared to other things 
as receiver to received, but as received to receiver”45.  
b) In XI, 23 Suárez asks if accidents have true existence. According to him, 
“the most recent Thomists” hold that accidents do not have an existence that is 
distinct from that of the subject in which they inhere. According to them, he 
continues, “the being of the subject is sufficient to sustain the accidents with 
which they are really united. They then add that the accident is not so much an 
ens as a part of ens, according to Aristotle in Book VII of the Metaphysics, who 
says that the being of the accident consists in being-in and that it is not an ens 
and does not have being except in as much as participated in the being of the 
subject”46. But Suárez, appealing to the authority of Scotus, rejects this opinion 
and affirms that “it is necessary to admit that accidental forms, in the same way 
that they have their own essence, also have their own existence. This was in fact 
the teaching of Scotus in In IV, dist. 12, q.1 […].  Hence we must say that the 
accidental form has its own existence which it communicates to the subject 
when it informs it”47. This only confirms our conclusions in the section on the 
accidental composition of substance when we said that accidents are beings in a 
proper, even if diminished and imperfect sense.  
                                                     
44    Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 8 a. 1: “Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et 
quod profundius omnibus inest”. 
45     Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 4 a. 1, ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfecti-
ssimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omni aut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum 
est, unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur 
ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens”. 
46     Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 11, 24. 
47      Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 11, 24-25. 
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c) The relation between essence and existence can only analogically be 
called a composition. “One must hold that the composition of essence and 
existence is called a composition “analogically” because it is not a real 
composition but only one of reason. In fact, real composition is only given 
between what is distinct in reality. But here the terms are not distinct in reality, 
as we have already seen. Hence their composition cannot be real”48. Nonethe-
less, this composition is not a fiction of the intellect but has a foundation in 
reality. The foundation is that “the creature does not have actual existence per 
se, because it is only a potential ens that can receive being by participation from 
another, and hence the essence of a creature is conceived by us as something 
potential and existence as a mode or an act by which the essence is constituted 
as an ens in act. In this sense one understands how this composition belongs to 
the essence of created being, because it is proper of its essence to not have being 
per se but only to participate it from another”49.  
d) Is the state of essence or that of existence the more perfect one? After 
stating that this question only makes sense to those who admit the real 
distinction between essence and existence, Suárez makes it clear that in his 
opinion essence is the more perfect: “Once we admit that actual essence has a 
being that is proper and that is found intrinsically and formally outside 
nothingness, and not in virtue of existence itself […], any foundation to holding 
that essence is less perfect than existence is destroyed”50. 
 
4. The problem of the composition of act and potency: predicamental 
and transcendental potency 
Suárez begins the question on potency with a long proemium. We quote it 
extensively here because of the richness of ideas it contains:  
 
                                                     
48     Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 13, 7: “At vero iuxta nostrum sententiam dicendum est compositio-
nem ex esse et essentia analogice tantum compositionem appellari, quia non est compositio realis, sed 
rationis; compositio enim realis non est nisi ex extremis in re ipsa distinctis; hic autem extrema non sunt 
in re distincta, ut ostendimus; ergo compositio ex illis non potest esse realis”. 
49   Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 13, 9: “Hoc autem fundamentum non est aliud nisi quia creatura 
non habet ex se actu existere, sed tantum est ens potentiale quod ab alio potest esse participare; nam 
hinc fit ut essentia creaturae concipiatur a nobis ut potentiale quid, esse vero ut modus seu actus quo 
talis essentia ens in actu constituitur. Atque in hoc sensu optime intelligitur quomodo haec compositio 
sit de essentia entis creati, nam de essentia eius est non habere esse ex se, sed solum posse participare 
illud ab alio”. 
50    Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 13, 21-22. 
Francisco Suárez, between modernity and tradition                                                                                       85 
 
CAURIENSIA, Vol. XII (2017) 63-92, ISSN: 1886-4945 
 
“On the multiple meanings of potency. Aristotle dealt with this question in 
Book V, c. 12 of the Metaphysics, and then again more extensively in Book IX 
of the Metaphysics. In these texts his use of the word ‘potency’ is more general 
than the one we assume in this dispute; because as Thomas noted in the 
Opusculo 48, c. 3 of the Qualit., potency can be understood in a transcendental 
or a predicamental way, i.e. in as much as a species of a determined predicate. 
With regard to the first mode we say that every being is divided into potency 
and act […] as we have already seen in Disp. XXXI, section 2 and 3. There we 
explained what the term objective potency refers to, because this, if it is 
something, or being what it is, belongs to transcendental potency […]. Besides 
this transcendental potency also refers to a possible thing, either with logical 
potency that is not repulsive, or with physical potency for the extrinsic 
determination taken from the potency of the agent or patient […]. Finally real 
potency, whether active or passive, is attributed to any principle of action or 
passion; and in this way it is attributed to the substantial principle and to prime 
matter, in as much as it is matter that receives the form, and to the substantial 
form, in as much as principle of action, and to God himself in as much as 
omnipotent being […]. We limit ourselves here to a more restricted sense of 
potency, i.e. that potency which is a type of quality”51.  
4.1. Predicamental Potency 
As outlined in the text above, Suárez holds that predicamental potency 
“belongs to the second species of quality.” In this sense, he continues, potency 
is the “proximate and connatural principle of the created agent to do something, 
and in this sense potency is always an accident”52. Predicamental potency “is 
said in reference to quality, because only qualities are proximate principles of 
action in the creature”53. This potency is then further divided into active and 
passive.  
Suárez also calls predicamental potency a “real potency.” This implies, ho-
wever, that transcendental potency is not real. It is for this reason that objective 
potency, which is a logical and not real potency, cannot be included within 
predicamental potency. This is hardly surprising: as we have already seen, 
objective potency or transcendental potency consists in the non-real state of 
essence before its creation. 
                                                     
51    Francisco Suárez, DM, 43, Proemium. 
52     Francisco Suárez, DM, 42, 3, 10. 
53     Francisco Suárez, DM, 42, 3, 10. 
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Finally, Suárez distinguishes between an active and a passive potency 
within predicamental potency54. The two are distinguished by the act that 
emanates from them: active potency corresponds to operation or secondary acts 
which arise from the potency but pass on to another subject; passive potency 
corresponds to the first act which remains within the same potency. “It is thus 
necessary to affirm that every real and predicamental potency is either active or 
passive, and that this division is sufficient […]. In fact potency, in as much as 
potency, is a type of first act [quidam actus primus] which affirms relation to 
the second”55. 
This last affirmation is an important one. Predicamental potency, whether 
active or passive, is for Suárez a “type of act” (quidam actus). Real potency is 
thus reduced to act precisely in order to save its reality, except that strictly 
speaking this reality does not belong to it as potency but as act. The true potential 
nature of potency is thus overturned with the formula potentia ut sic est quidam 
actus, and because of this real potency as such disappears. But this is hardly 
surprising; as we have already seen, “in created things, being in potency and 
being in act are immediately and formally distinguished as ens et non ens 
simpliciter”56. Hence both predicamental (or real) and transcendental (or 
objective) potency are not truly potencies: the first because it is an act, the 
second because it is a nothingness. 
But without any true potency, Suárez is forced to move towards a position 
where act is limited only by itself. He rejects as false, in fact, that the idea that 
“a being not received in something cannot be limited, because there is no 
receptive potency or difference to contract it,” because “act is limited and finite 
in itself and in virtue of its own being, and it has no need of something really 
distinct from it to limit or contract it; rather it is in virtue of its own formal being 
that it is intrinsically determined through its own nature and that determined 
magnitude of perfection that it has, while it is extrinsically limited by God both 
as efficient and exemplar cause”57. 
Act is thus not limited through a potency that receives it. And Suárez then 
applies this nominalistic principle to the distinction between essence and 
existence: “Since existence is nothing other than essence in act, then just as 
actual essence is formally limited by itself or by its intrinsic principles, so too is 
created existence limited by means of the essence itself, not because this is the 
                                                     
54   Cf. Francisco Suárez, DM, 43, 3, 2. 
55    Francisco Suárez, DM, 43, 1, 6. 
56    Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 3, 1. 
57    Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 13, 18. 
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potency in which existence is received but because existence is nothing other 
than the very same actual essence”58. 
Suárez is thus convinced, like Scotus before him, that finite act is finite in 
itself and that infinite act is infinite in itself. The Thomist idea that potency 
limits act is thus replaced with the doctrine of the intrinsic limitation of act. And 
in fact for Suárez potency is not truly potency but act. The followers of Suárez 
were thus always resolutely opposed to the Thomist idea of the unicity and 
infinite nature of pure act59.  
“Real potency” is therefore a strange and even erroneous term for Suárez. 
For the factor that makes it real, its conversion into act, is at the same time that 
which does not truly allow it to be a potency. At the predicamental level of 
potency therefore, there is no true distinction between potency and act, but rather 
an assimilation of the former to the latter. The relation between potency and act 
is thus replaced between the relation between first and second act. True potency 
has thus disappeared even if it has an orientation to a more perfect act. Like 
Scotus, Descartes, and so many others, Suárez has completely misunderstood 
the nature of the act-potency composition because he conceives of potency as a 
reality that already has its own act. But this idea seriously risks the unity of 
composed being. Rather than composition we have a conversion or assimilation 
of potency to first act and then its relation to second act. It is this idea of potency 
as act which is the true foundation of the theories we have already seen above, 
for example the idea that prime matter already has its own actuality.  
4.2. Transcendental Potency 
According to Suárez, the distinction between “predicamental potency” and 
“transcendental potency” is the same as that between “real potency” and “unreal 
potency.” He thus also calls transcendental potency “logical potency” or 
“objective potency.” 
In Chapter 9 of the Index locupletissimus, where Suárez proposes his 
division between being in act and potency, he says that the division is not one 
“between beings that are essentially distinct, but between different states of the 
same being because of its existence”60. Disputatio XXXI presents the same 
                                                     
58    Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 13, 18: “Unde cum existentia nihil aliud sit quam essentia in actu 
constituta, sicut essentia actualis per seipsam vel per sua intrinseca principia est formaliter limitata, ita 
etiam existentia creata limitationem habet ex ipsa essentia, non ut est potentia in qua recipitur, sed quia 
in re nihil aliud est quam ipsamet actualis essentia”. 
59    Cf. Paul B. Grenet, Ontología (Barcelona: Herder, 1985), 52. 
60   Francisco Suárez, DM, Index Locupletissimus, IX, proemium: “[...] dividere ens in ens in 
potentia vel in actu [...] non est divisio in entia essentialiter diversa, sed in diversos status ejusdem entis 
secundum rationem existendi”. The emphasis is ours.  
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argument: “In creatures being in potency and being in act are distinguished 
immediately and formally as ens and non-ens simpliciter. Some call this a 
negative distinction because one of the terms is true while the other is not; others 
call the distinction one of reason because they are not two realities but only one 
reality which the intellect conceives of and compares as if they were two”61. The 
relation between being in potency and being in act is thus the same as that which 
exists between a negative and positive state, keeping in mind however that only 
the positive state, i.e. being in as much as in act, is real. 
For Suárez potency and act are therefore not two metaphysical principles 
that are really distinct and which ens is composed of. Potency, or being in 
potency (essentia possibilis), and act, or being in act (essentia actualis) are not 
two principles but the same reality conceived of by the intellect as two states of 
the same ens. 
In Disputatio XLIII, while speaking of “objective potency,” Suárez writes: 
“[objective potency], if it is something, or being what it may be, belongs to 
transcendental potency”62. A little further on in the Proemium he says that 
objective potency is not a type of predicamental potency because transcendental 
potency “is a determined species of quality”63. He also claims that objective 
potency is “an almost negative potency which consists in a non-repugnance 
towards esse. This is why it is called a logical possible, because it has logical 
potency”. The potency is called logical “because it does not consist in a real 
faculty, but in the non-repugnance of the terms which are considered in the order 
of composition and division of the mind as proper of logic”64. 
For Suárez, therefore, “transcendental potency,” “logical potency,” and 
“objective potency” are synonyms. Nonetheless, the term “transcendental po-
tency” emphasises the capacity that an ens which does not yet exist has to begin 
to exist. “Objective potency,” on the other hand, emphasises the ideal content of 
that ens which, even though it does not exist, is realizable. And “logical 
potency” underlines the ideal character of this “object” of reason. 
In Disputatio XIV, which discusses whether “act and potency are in the 
same genus,” Suárez is forced to explain and defend Scotus’ opinion on 
“objective potency” (quid  obiectiva potentia apud Scotum). He says that what 
Scotus means by “objective potency” is the same as what he calls “being [ens] 
in potency,” and that what Scotus meant by the term “was not a true reality that 
                                                     
61    Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 3, 1. 
62    Francisco Suárez, DM, 43, Proemium. 
63    Francisco Suárez, DM, 43, 1, 2. 
64    Francisco Suárez, DM, 42, 3, 9. 
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actually exists in nature, which is only real active or passive potency […], but a 
reality in the state of possibility before existing in act, in the way that we say 
that something is in potency before existing […].” In this sense, Suárez conti-
nues, “he [Scotus] affirms that this potency and its act are of the same genus; 
and one can even affirm that they are negatively the same reality […] because 
they are not two realities but the same one conceived of as being in different 
states”65.  
It is thus clear that “objective potency” is not, according to Suárez, a 
metaphysical principle but simply a state or mode of being. 
“Being in objective potency is simpliciter nihil, or non-ens in act”66. 
Objective potency is thus assimilated into nothingness, in conformity with the 
already stated Suarezian principle that the distinction between being in potency 
and being in act is like that between ens and non-ens simpliciter.  
In this way, even when considered transcendentally, potency in as much as 
potency disappears. If at the predicamental level potency was defined as a type 
of act (quidam actus), at the transcendental level it is defined as non-ens 
simpliciter, as nothingness. Potency is thus no longer a metaphysical medium 
between being (act) and non-being (nothingness), but is assimilated into one of 
the two extremes: into act in as much as predicamental potency, and into 
nothingness in the case of transcendental potency. There is no middle term here: 
we either have act or nothingness. Nonetheless, this nothingness is not a simple 
being of reason; while remaining nothing it is a possibility in the area of real 
essence and thus has a certain title to existence. This fitness towards existence, 
this aptitudo ad existendum (in words of Suárez, wich later will say Leibniz) is 
what distinguishes beings of reason and beings in potency (predicamental 




                                                     
65    Francisco Suárez, DM, 14, 2, 13: “Nam ille [Scotus] non intelligit per potentiam obiectivam 
aliquam veram rem quae sit actu in rerum natura, quo sensu sola potentia activa vel passiva est potentia 
realis [...] sed per potentiam obiectivam intelligit Scotus rem in statu possibili antequam actu sit, 
quomodo dicimus rem esse in potentia antequam sit [...]. Atque ita dicit hanc potentiam et actum esse 
eiusdem generis, quia res possibilis et res in actu eiusdem generis sunt; immo dicere etiam posset esse 
eamdem rem negative (ut aiunt), quia non sunt duae res, sed eadem in diversis statibus concepta”. The 
emphasis is ours.  
66      Francisco Suárez, DM, 31, 3, 6: “Quia ens in potentia obiectiva, ut ostendimus, est simpliciter 
nihil seu non ens actu”. 
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The disappearance of potency in Suárez 
The notion of potency in Suárez is divided into two senses, even if none of 
them can actually be considered a potency: predicamental potency which is 
identified with act, and objective or transcendental potency which is at the 
purely logical and hence intentional level. Potency as a medium between act and 
nothingness is thus missing in Suárez and this sets him apart from Plato (me-on 
in the relative sense), Aristotle (dynamis) and Thomas (potentia). Thomas in 
fact states quite clearly that “being in potency is almost a medium between pure 
non-being and being in act”67. 
 
2. The actualism of Suárez 
The disappearance of potency in the philosophy of Suárez can also be called 
actualism. This actualism, which was to become a defining characteristic of 
rationalism, brings back memories of Parmenides. In fact the rigid nature of 
Suárezian esse, which is found only in the complete and perfect being that is act, 
puts the world what we know from experience at risk: the world in which nature 
is the principle of movement precisely because it is incomplete and potential 
and tends towards the perfection that is its end. The philosophy of Suárez thus 
disregards the instability that characterizes everything that is not the absolute 
principle, Pure Act, God. 
 
3. Is Suárez a rationalist? 
Why does Suárez take the path toward actualism? One possible reason is 
the excessive importance he gives to his theory of knowledge, a characteristic 
common to many authors of the end of the Middle Ages and of the so-called 
second Scholasticism. For that part of ens which is in a special relation to the 
intellect is essence, and that which is intelligible is so because it is in act. Actual 
essence is thus the principle of intelligibility of the real. And it is thus hardly 
surprising that that a philosophy which is dominated by the desire for 
intelligibility falls into the temptation of forgetting that other aspect of being 
which is real but in ‘darkness’, i.e. potency. There is, in other words, a logical 
connection between actualism and rationalism.  
                                                     
67     Thomas Aquinas, In I Phys., lc. 9 n. 60: “Ens autem in potentia est quasi medium inter purum 
non ens et ens in actu”. 
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In as much as the essence is the determined mode of ens which is expressed 
in its definition, it is in a unique relation with the intellect. Now the intellect 
always grasps being within a certain form; a direct apprehension of being is 
impossible for the intellect because of its excess of actuality. Even potency, at 
least in the system of Thomas, is not directly intelligible (this time because of a 
lack of actuality), and cannot be grasped except in relation to the corresponding 
act or form. Suárez needed in other words an object for the intellect, an object 
that was neither too dense nor too light for it. It could not be too dense, and 
following the footsteps of an Avicennian Platonism Suárez thus reduces being 
to actual essence. But neither could it be too light, and for this reason the 
cumbersome notion of potency had to expelled from the kingdom of clear and 
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